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NOTES
RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC Loss ABSENT PHYSICAL
DAMAGE TO A PROPRIETARY INTEREST: DOES
TESTBANK DIM THE BRIGHT-LINE?
In July of 1980, the M/V Testbank collided with the M/V Seadaniel
in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. Containers of highly toxic chemicals'
carried by the Testbank were lost overboard and federal authorities
closed off a large area of the outlet and surrounding waterways to
navigation and fishing for a period of twenty days. Lawsuits were filed
against the vessel owners by shipping interests who lost profits and
incurred expenses because of delays, and by various commercial busi-
nesses who suffered a loss of trade because of the closure. These
businesses included marine and boat rental operators, wholesale and
retail seafood enterprises not engaged in fishing, seafood restaurants,
tackle and bait shops, and commercial and recreational fishermen. Li-
ability was asserted on various theories of maritime tort, private actions
pursuant to the laws of the United States and the laws of the state of
Louisiana. Defendants sought summary judgment as to all claims of
economic loss unaccompanied by actual physical damage.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
granted the motion against all plaintiffs except commercial fisherman,
oystermen, crabbers, and shrimpers who routinely operated in the em-
bargoed waterways. The court based its holding on the favored status
traditionally enjoyed by seamen in admiralty and stated that "their
economic interests require the fullest possible legal protection." 2 A panel
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed basing its conclusion on
the precedent established in Robins Dry Dock v. Flint,3 that a plaintiff
could not recover economic losses where no physical injury to a pro-
prietary interest had been sustained. 4 The Fifth Circuit en banc re-
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The Testbank was carrying twelve tons of pentaclorophenol (PCP), assertedly the
largest such spill in United States history. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752
F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985).
2. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F.Supp 1170, 1173 (E.D. La.
1981). See Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953) (the right of fishermen to
recover their share of the prospective catch is a manifestation of the principle that seamen
are the favorites of admiralty).
3. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S. Ct. 134 (1927).
4. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984).
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examined the prerequisite of physical damage to a proprietary interest
and affirmed its commitment to the limitation on recovery as developed
by the Robins doctrine. It is notable, however, that the court struggled
in making its decision to reaffirm the bright-line rule of Robins, as
evidenced by three separate concurring opinions, two of which suggest
that the Robins line might not be so bright, and by two strong dissents,
one of which pegs Robins as the "Tar Baby of tort law."' Louisiana
ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
While the Robins rule relieves a tortfeasor from potentially ruinous,
unlimited liability6 and recognizes limits on the adjudicatory ability of
courts, the rule also has the negative aspects of unfairness, arbitrariness,
and mechanical application which are associated with any bright-line
rule. This casenote will explore the difficulties encountered by courts in
developing and applying tests to determine which claims will be satisfied
when economic losses are incurred absent physical damage to a pro-
prietary interest in a maritime setting. Additionally, it will suggest some
functional inquiries, based on policy issues, which may serve as a guide
in making this determination, and which appear to be factors considered
by the court regardless of the specific test or rule employed.
In Robins, a ship owner placed his vessel in drydock for repairs
which were delayed because the drydock negligently damaged the ship's
propeller. The owner compromised his claim against the shipyard while
the charterer of the ship sued for profits lost as a result of the ship's
unavailability on the charter date. The United States Supreme Court
denied recovery stating that the time-charterer was without any pro-
prietary interest in the vessel and, as such, it could not recover economic
losses sustained based on the drydock's unintentional interference with
the charterer's contract. The rule applied by the Court in Robins has
become a well-established principle of law which limits a plaintiff's
recovery of foreseeable damages by precluding recovery for economic
loss absent physical damage or personal injury. As explained by one
commentator, "The explanation ... is a pragmatic one: the physical
consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect
economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually
open-ended."'
In Testbank, plaintiffs sought to categorize the tort in Robins as a
species of interference with contract and to limit its applicability to
losses suffered for inability to perform contracts between the party
5. 752 F.2d at 1035.
6. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging Corp., 419 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1982).
7. 275 U.S. 303-04, 48 S. Ct. 134.
8. James, Limitations on Liability For Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 43, 45 (1972).
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claiming injury and others.9 The court, however, found that the scope
of Robins was much broader and' stated:, "If a time, charterer's rela-
tionship to, its negligently injured vessel is too remote, other claimants
without even the connection of a contract are even more, remote."' 0
The dissent" stated that Robins "provides an. overly restrictive bar on
recovery" and. that "[these plaintiffs do not need. to, rely on a contract
to link them to the tort: The: collision proximately caused their, losses,
and those losses were foreseeable." 2
The majority was supported by several cases in, which the Fifth
Circuit had denied recovery for economic loss absent physical' damage'. 3
In Louisville and Nashville' R.R.. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe,.4 the. plaintiff
had' a contractual right to use a bridge which, defendant negligently
damaged. The court found that the plaintiff's, right of use: did not
constitute a proprietary interest sufficient to support recovery' under the
Robins rule.,5
The cases which the plaintiffs in Testbank relied upon were' discussed
by the, majority in support of its conclusion;, however; these cases em-
ployed various, legal theories and are only arguably compatible' with
Testbank. Plaintiffs argued that Kinsman Transit Co. v. BUffalo 6 and'
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen7 supported. a departure from the Robins
doctrine.. Kinsman was the, outgrowth of a disaster on the Buffalo, River
which. resulted in a two-month disruption, of river traffic.' Plaintiffs
were suppliers of grain who incurred additional expenses in' fulfilling
their contracts as a result- of the mishap. The court dismissed the. claims,
on the basis that these damages. were too remote and unforeseeable
rather than on the negligent interference with contract theory which.
automatically classifies this type of economic injury as. unforeseeable,," '
thus unrecoverable.. The. majority in Testbank found, despite the Kinsman
9. 752 F.2d at 1023.
10. Id.
II. All references are to Judge Wisdom's dissent, Id. at 1035.
12. Id. at 1040.,
13. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957 (5th
Cir. 1972); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United. States, 577 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir.
1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
14. Louisville & N.R.R. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979).
15. Id. at 473.
16. Kinsman Transit Co. v. Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
18. Kinsman Transit owned a ship which was improperly docked at Continental Grain
Company's dock. The ship broke' loose' and crashed into another ship. Together the ships
floated down the river and crashed into and collapsed the Michigan Avenue Bri'dge. The
bridge was capable of being raised but the bridge. crew failed to do so. The, wreckage.
of the bridge and the two. ships formed a. dam and ice jam reaching, three miles. upstream..
19. 388 F.2d at 824.
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court's departure from the Robins theory, that the limitation placed on
foreseeability supported its rationale. 20 The dissent viewed Kinsman as
contradictory to the majority opinion and concluded that "[tihe import
of Kinsman was to establish foreseeability as the test for liability instead
of the requirement of physical injury."'" The dissent also argued that
the Kinsman approach involved a case-by-case analysis rather than the
blanket bar of Robins.2
The majority similarly dispensed with the alternate method of anal-
ysis adopted in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen. In this case commercial
fisherman sued Union Oil for lost profits sustained from a reduction
in fishing potential caused by an oil spill. The Union Oil court found
that the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs to refrain from negligent
conduct in their drilling operations, which conduct reasonably and for-
seeably could have been anticipated to cause a diminution of the aquatic
life in the area and thus cause injury to the plaintiffs' business.23 Rather
than emphasizing the foreseeability approach taken by the Union Oil
court, the Testbank majority concentrated on the fact that the right of
recovery was limited to commercial fisherman and that it was not
available to others who may have suffered economic damage as a result
of the oil spill.2 4 As with Kinsman, the Testbank dissent viewed Union
Oil as an exception to the Robins rule, and in contrast with the majority
opinion, the dissent emphasized the employment of a foreseeability anal-
ysis in determining the question of liability.25
Both the majority and the dissent cited PPG Industries Inc. v. Bean
Dredging in support of their conclusions. In PPG, a dredging contractor
was sued for damaging a natural gas line which supplied plaintiff's
plant with fuel. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
could not recover for its increased expense in obtaining fuel since the
losses sustained were outside the scope of protection encompassed by
the duty of care imposed on the defendant. 26 The Testbank majority
cited PPG for the reason that it did not extend liability,2 7 while the
dissent emphasized the case because a duty risk analysis was applied
20. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1026.
21. Id. at 1042.
22. Id.
23. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 568.
24. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1026.
25. Id. at 1043.
26. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging Corp., 447 So. 2d 1058, 1061 (La. 1984).
Under the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1983), admiralty law could have
been applied in the case. Whether it was intentionally (as an attempt to circumvent the
Robins doctrine) or accidently overlooked is unknown.
27. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1028.
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instead of the Robins rule which was rejected as "a mechanical approach
to [an] unreasoned conclusion." 8
The judicial efficiency that the Robins bright-line rule provides seems
to be the majority's primary reason for maintaining the physical damage
requirement. While conceding that the rule "has the virtue of predict-
ability with the vice of creating results in cases at its edge that are said
to be 'unjust' or 'unfair'," the court maintained that "[it operates as
a rule of law and allows a court to adjudicate rather than manage.''29
Judge Gee stated in his concurrence that "the dispute-resolution systems
of courts are poorly equipped to manage disasters of such magnitude
and that we should be wary of adopting rules of decision which, as
would that contended for by the dissent, encourage the drawing of their
broader aspects before us." 30 The dissent contended that the Robins
requirement of physical damage was contrary to traditional tort principles
of foreseeability and proximate cause and advocated a case-by-case anal-
ysis which would shift the loss from innocent plaintiffs to negligent
defendants. The dissent went on to say that its proposed inquiry "would
be no different from our daily task of weighing such claims in other
tort cases."'"
Courts are often faced with the question of whether to create ex-
ceptions in order to accommodate special situations when a bright-line
approach has been adopted as a rule of law. In Testbank, this tension
is apparent in that the court had difficulty justifying recovery for the
commercial fisherman while denying the claims of'ihe other plaintiffs.
While the majority subtly noted in footnote ten32 of its opinion that
the issue of liability to the commercial fishermen was not before the
court, Judge Williams wrote a separate concurrence for the purpose of
pointing out that the fishermen's claim would not have met the re-
quirement of physical damage to a proprietary interest had it been before
the court. He suggested that "the rule be stated with enough additional
breadth to allow recovery for those who are damaged because they make
their living out of a 'resource' of the water." 33 Judge Garwood, in his
concurrence, was also cognizant of the problems caused by rigid ap-
plication of a bright-line rule. In reference to the commercial fishermen's
claim, he stated that "the physical harm or invasion requirement may
not be inflexible or without exception, and that, in certain unusual
instances, a relatively restrictive application of the public nuisance theory
28. PPG, 477 So. 2d at 1060.
29. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029.
30. Id. at 1032.
31. Id. at 1051-52.
32. Id. at 1027.
33. Id. at 1034.
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of damage or invasion different in kind, rather than degree, or something
analogous thereto, may be an appropriate substitute. '3
4
The plaintiff in Testbank asserted public nuisance as an alternate
theory of recovery based on defendant's interference with public rights
which caused them to suffer "particular damage." However, the majority
found that such recovery "is as difficult, if not more so, as determining
which foreseeable damages are too remote to justify recovery in neg-
ligence.,," The dissent viewed the public nuisance theory as a tool to
limit liability for widely-suffered harm since recovery is restricted to
those who are "particularly" damaged and denied to those who suffered
more general harm.
3 6
Prior to Testbank, the Fifth Circuit, in at least two maritime cases,
granted recovery to plaintiffs who had not suffered physical damage to
a proprietary interest. In J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. SS Egero,7
plaintiff had contracted with Texaco to build a pipeline and had entered
into a subcontract for certain excavation work needed to fulfill the
primary contract. After defendant dropped anchor "near" the pipeline,
it was necessary for McDermott to test the pipeline in order to assure
Texaco that it had not been damaged. McDermott sued to recover delay
damages including the additional sums it was required to pay the sub-
contractor for the time that its equipment was idle during the delay.
This court stated, "Robins does not stand for the proposition that no
one may recover damages suffered or liabilities incurred by virtue of a
contract when a ship is tortiously detained. Certainly the ship owner
may recover all damages proximately caused by another's tortious con-
duct with respect to his ship."" The Court noted that the case was not
one where the subcontractor was suing for profits which could have
been earned from the use of its equipment had it not been detained,
rather, the court classified the case as one brought by the "owner" of
the pipeline project for reimbursement of delay expenses. 9 This labeling
of McDermott as the "owner" of the project is interesting in that
McDermott clearly was not the owner of the detained equipment, and
the pipeline, of which McDermott may have been regarded as "owner,"
was not physically damaged but merely delayed in construction. Under
this rationale it seems that the vessels in Testbank would be entitled to
recover additional demurrage and fuel expenses incurred from. the closure
of the waterways but would not be able to recover the earnings of a
more profitable use foregone as a result of the delay.
34. Id. at 1035.
35. Id. at 1030.
36. Id. at 1046.
37. J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. SS Egero, 453 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 1204.
39. Id.
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Similar costs were awarded to shippers in In re Lyra Shipping Co.,'
where defendant's vessel blocked a canal. The court granted recovery
to Cabot Corporation who had a contract with a shipping company to
transport Cabot's cargo. The defendant's blockage of the canal prevented
the shipper from making the necessary passage. While noting that the
plaintiff corporation was not itself a user of the canal, the court found
that it could recover from defendant any additional expenses owed to
the shipping company and stated, "as between Cabot and Lyra Shipping
it is the latter who should bear the cost of this surcharge."'
It is interesting that the first case interpreting Testbank's re-affirm-
ance of the Robins rule grants rather than denies recovery. In Domar
Ocean Transportation, Ltd. v. M/V Andrew Martin,42 plaintiff had
chartered Cenac Towing Company's tug, Cindy Cenac to tow its barge,
the Domar 7001. The defendant's tug, Andrew Martin, struck and
damaged the Domar 7001 while the chartered tug, Cindy Cenac, sustained
no physical damage. The defendant contested the fact that the district
court's award to the plaintiff included the loss of the optimal use of
the chartered tug which had not been physically damaged, but which
earned less than it would have had it not been deprived of its tow, the
Domar 7001. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had a suf-
ficient proprietary interest in the barge and the chartered tug as an
integrated unit to warrant granting recovery and stated: "Testbank is
no bar to Domar's recovery for the loss of use of the unit." 43
It is difficult to distinguish Domar's interest in the tug from the
charterer's interest in the ship in Robins. One factor which may have
influenced the court was the fact that in Domar the charter contract
was in active operation at the time of the interference. This factor may
become more significant when examined in reference to the policies it
serves. Contractual relations are variable by their nature and one of the
reasons courts may be reluctant to grant recovery for interference with
these relations is the difficulty in determining whether the interference
has in fact resulted from the negligent conduct." However, where a
contractual obligation or right is being actively performed and a negligent
act disrupts its performance, the determination of the cause of the
40. In re Lyra Shipping Co., 360 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. La. 1973).
41. Id. at 1192.
42. Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd. v. M/V Andrew Martin, 754 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.
1985).
43. Id. at 619. Another case interpreting Testbank stated that, "Testbank stands for
the proposition that physical injury to one's own property is ordinarily a prerequisite to
recovery in tort. Testbank does not say or imply that Robin Dry Dock is inapplicable
to every case in which the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury .... " Cargill, Inc. v.
Doxford & Sunderland, Ltd., No. 85-3486, slip op. at 2988 (5th Cir. filed Feb. 12, 1986).
44. Restatement (Second) of Tort § 766B Commentary at 20 (1977).
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interference is readily apparent. In addition, in this type of situation
the amount of damage is finite, not speculative.
For example, in McDermott, where the pipeline contractor was
permitted to recover its delay expenses, the amount of recovery was
limited by a "liquidated damages" clause which provided that Mc-
Dermott would pay the subcontractor "$4,000 per day .. .for standby
time in excess of the seven days. '"4 Allowing recovery where the cost
of the interference is limited and defined also diminishes the court's
fear of imposing liability on a defendant engaged in useful activity which
is out of proportion with the defendant's fault. In addition, in these
situations involving a single plaintiff, the court is not faced with a class
of endless claimants which would require expenditure of judicial resources
and increased liability for the defendant. Neither of these factors were
present in Testbank, where most of the plaintiff's claims were based
solely on prospective contractual relations and profits, and where the
class of plaintiffs was large.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe also in-
volved interference with the plaintiff's active exercise of its contractual
right to use the bridge; however, a significant factor in the court's denial
of recovery was the fact that the defendant had already paid the bridge
owner for the physical damage to the bridge. 46 This decision reflects
the underlying policy concern of imposing double liability on the tort-
feasor.
This concern was also apparent in Robins, as noted by one com-
mentator who suggested the policy issue behind the decision to be:
[T]he reluctance of the Court to hold the tort-feasor liable, in
addition to the physical damage to the vessel, for the value of
two bargains. Under the contract with the owners, the charterers
were excused from paying rent while the ship was laid up for
repairs. This loss was included in the settlement between the
defendants and the owners. Having made one good bargain, the
tortfeasor is now asked to make good the still better bargain
of the charterer.47
The same fear was addressed by the court in Lyra.41 While the court
granted recovery to Cabot Corporation for defendant's interference with
its shipping contract, the court noted that had the shipping company
sued Lyra, Cabot would not have incurred recoverable damages. But
where the shipping company proceeded against plaintiff, it was placed
in a position of an "equitable subrogee" to the shippers rights against
45. McDermott, 453 F.2d at 1203.
46. Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d at 474.
47. F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 6.10 at 504 (1956).
48. See infra text accompanying note 40.
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the defendant. 9 Thus it appears that in situations where the plaintiff
is seeking to recover damages for which the defendant has already
assumed its liability to another party, courts will dismiss the plaintiff's
claim for recovery of the same loss.
In Kinsman, PPG, and Union Oil, where the courts rejected Robins
in favor of a foreseeability, duty risk, and public nuisance 0 analysis
respectively, the underlying policy issues seemed to be the determining
factor in granting or denying the right of recovery. For example, in
Kinsman, the court stated that it was foreseeable that the accident would
cause the river to dam, the transportation of goods to be delayed, and
expenses to be incurred; however, the court denied recovery and stated
that "somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that
the link has become too tenuous."'" The link becomes too tenuous when
the societal policies for shifting the risk to the defendant will not be
served. While imposing liability on a party has the consequences of
deterring negligent behavior and encouraging safety measures in the
maritime industry, it is not desirable to deter behavior to the point of
placing defendants who are engaged in useful activity out of business.
In such cases it may be more economically efficient to leave the risk
where it falls as imposing liability on the defendant may have the effect
of granting double recovery to the plaintiff where the plaintiff has filtered
the cost of the risk of economic losses through his business dealings.
Also, as the majority in Testbank points out, it is not feasible to suggest
that defendants should bear this risk through insurance, in that insurers
are unlikely to protect risks that may result in unending "catastrophic"
liability. 2
In contrast, the policy issues behind Testbank and Union Oil seem
to support recognizing the claims of commercial fishermen and imposing
liability on the defendants. The public's strong disapproval of injuries
to the environment and the desire to place high incentives to -take proper
care on businesses which pose a threat to the environment lessen the
danger of over-deterrence through the imposition of liability." Indeed,
in such situations, the tortfeasor is in a better position than the com-
mercial fishermen to know and therefore insure against the risks as-
sociated with his activities.
The policies served in PPG are less apparent than the previous cases.
While Justice Lemmon stated that it was necessary to "consider the
49. Lyra, 360 F. Supp. at 1192.
50. While a forseeability approach was the primary mode of analysis in Union Oil,
the court noted that plaintiffs could also recover under a public nuisance approach. 501
F.2d at 570.
51. Kinsman, 388 F.2d at 824-25.
52. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029; James, supra note 8. at 52-55.
53. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 569.
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particular case in terms of the moral, social and economic values in-
volved," '5 4 he makes no specific reference as to what these values are
other than the danger of extending liability "in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."" The appellate
court had discussed the possibility that in this case the plaintiff could
have contracted with Texaco for the right to indemnity should the
pipeline be damaged.' 6 It seems that the court was concerned with
imposing double liability on the defendant. This danger, however, could
have been counter-balanced with policies in favor of recovery, in that
the case involved only a single plaintiff and the amount of damages
would have been relatively limited and defined. Justice Calogero criticized
the decision and stated, "If PPG is to be denied its added fuel cost I
can perceive no instance in which a non-owner of negligently damaged
property may recover from a tortfeasor."I' The primary significance of
the case is the court's recognition of the plaintiff's right to have his
case heard through the employment of a duty risk analysis rather than
dismissed as dictated by Robins. However, in light of the decision, the
utilization of a different theory does not seem to make a difference.
As the cases represent, the employment of a foreseeability, duty
risk, or public nuisance mode of analysis does not necessarily mean that
liability will be extended, just as the adoption of the Robins bright-line
approach does not necessarily mean that a claim will be denied, for
recovery has been denied in the former and granted in the latter.
Emphasis is misplaced when the inquiry is narrowed to the question of
which test properly fits the circumstances. A more functional inquiry
would concentrate on which policies would be served by either granting
or denying the right to recovery. Such inquiries would include: whether
plaintiffs can be segregated from a class which suffered only a general
harm from the negligent act, whether the amount of recovery is deter-
minable and finite, the balancing of the desire to discourage negligent
conduct with the danger of over-deterrence, whether the imposition of
liability would be out of proportion with the defendant's negligence,
the desire to avoid imposing double liability on the defendant, and the
consideration of which party is in the better position to allocate the
loss.
Tamara Dixon
54. PPG, 447 So.2d at 1061.
55. Id. at 1061, citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E.
441, 444 (1931).
56. PPG, 419 So.2d at 24.
57. PPG, 447 So.2d at 1062.
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